In his critique, Connor (1996) raised a number of questions surrounding predator inspection behaviour in fish and the evolution of cooperation. Here I will address three claims made by Connor and make a few general comments on the questions he raised. First, however, I wish to touch briefly on another issue. Following WestEberhard (1975) and Brown (1983) , I have argued that by-product mutualism is one means of achieving cooperation among individuals, and I have gone as far as to say that Although the evidence from empirical studies is inconclusive, it strongly suggests that reciprocal altruism is only one of three categories of cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in nature: it fails to justify the bias toward reciprocity in the recent theoretical literature. . . . In particular the potential importance of by-product mutualism appears to have been overlooked [Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1992, page 278] So, my argument with Connor (1996) is not that by-product mutualism is a weak force, nor that it does not allow for partner choice, but rather that, in the case of predator inspection in fish, by-product mutualism does not explain the available data as well as Tit for Tat.
The following comments address Connor's specific claims.
(1) Connor (1996) remarked, 'Unable to provide unequivocal evidence for a Prisoner's Dilemma or to reject shoaling hypotheses conclusively in favour of Tit for Tat, various authors have argued that consistent patterns of partner preference support the hypothesis that the dynamics of joint inspection are governed by Tit for Tat (page 452). The first part of this statement is only partly true, and the second part is completely false. With respect to the claim that evidence for a Prisoner's Dilemma is weak, Milinski has argued numerous times (starting with Milinski 1987) that the biology of predator inspection probably satisfies the Prisoner's Dilemma (temptation to cheat, T, >reward for mutual inspection, R, >punish-ment when no one inspects, P, >sucker's payoff when a lone fish inspects, S). Empirical evidence, gathered outside the context of predator inspection and cooperation (e.g. from work on the selfish herd, spatial 'oddity' and predation threat; Milinski 1977a, b), suggests that S (inspecting alone) is indeed the worst payoff for inspection. Furthermore, Dugatkin (1992) explicitly tested one inequality of the Prisoner's Dilemma, namely that within groups containing both inspectors and non-inspectors, inspectors suffer greater predation threat; i.e. T>R. The data, although correlational, suggest that this inequality is indeed met when inspecting predators (cf. Godin & Davis 1995). Thus, some of the inequalities of the Prisoner's Dilemma can be gleaned from the available literature, and the others can be inferred from an understanding of predator-prey interactions and predator inspection; as such, Connor's statement that evidence for the Prisoner's Dilemma is unavailable is only partly true.
The second part of Connor's (1996) quote, that researchers have not been able to distinguish Tit for Tat from 'shoaling hypotheses' (an amorphous term in this context) is incorrect. Although the 'Tit-for-Tat controversy' has burned long and hard (particularly in this journal), the sum of the experimental evidence now available strongly supports the notion that fish are indeed playing Tit for Tat (Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988 Dugatkin , 1991 Milinski et al. 1990a, b; Dugatkin & Alfieri 1991a , 1992 Huntingford et al. 1994) . Perhaps the most direct test of this is Dugatkin's (1991) study, which showed experimental evidence that guppies from areas of high-predation threat display all
